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Summary
This paper reviews the literature on decentralisation in 
Africa, with a focus on impact on service delivery and 
poverty reduction. It notes decentralisation is not neces-
sarily good or bad, but success depends on the details 
of policy design and context, particularly the political 
motivations of ruling elites and its relations with local 
power bases and constituencies. In Africa, decentralisa-
tion is widespread but not deep. Driven largely by polit-
ical motivations, decentralisation experiences in the 
region have consisted mostly of deconcentration of 
administrative functions, rather than true devolution of 
powers. Although there is limited evidence available, the 
impact of decentralisation on service delivery is probably 
limited, judging by its impact on intermediate variables 
such as access to information, locus of power, administra-
tive performance and accountability relations. The pro-
poor character of decentralisation is also questionable. 
Available evidence does not confirm that decentralised 
governments perform better in delivering services to 
the poor, despite the fact they ofter are their largest 
constituency. In Africa, decentralisation has been essen-
tially used to consolidate alliances with local elites and 
thereby reinforce central power, rather than to pursue 
pro-poor policies. Institutional weaknesses and fiscal 
constraints have also limited the success of decentralisa-
tion in Africa. Therefore, as an overarching governance 
process, decentralisation may have limited chances of 
success without a more structural transformation in 
African societies which reduces the polarisation of power 
and gives the median voter greater agency.
Introduction
Decentralisation reforms have been pursued throughout 
Africa over the last 30 years with the aims of improving 
governance efficiency and making policy more respon-
sive to the needs of local people, particularly the poor. 
But behind these vocalised aims, political motivations 
are a major driving force. Decentralisation has often been 
used to expand the power of the ruling elite to local 
levels or to neutralise challenging forces emerging from 
below. 
There is a lack of systematic analyses of decentralisa-
tion in Africa and its impact in service delivery and 
poverty reduction. The limited evidence available 
suggests, however, that decentralisation is yet to deliver 
its promised results. There is hardly any evidence that 
service delivery and poverty indicators have improved 
as result of decentralised governance. 
The motivations of political leaders and the configura-
tion of political systems – in Africa often characterised 
by the absence of accountability mechanisms and limited 
mobilisation of local constituencies – may explain in part 
the lack of success. Institutional weaknesses at both 
central and local level are also a major constraint in Africa, 
particularly the failure to design reform packages with 
a systematic sequencing and to coordinate all actors 
involved in decentralisation processes. Yet, some argue 
that decentralisation in Africa has not had a fair trial as 
few countries have experienced true devolution of 
powers and resources to local governments. 
Decentralisation processes have largely been incomplete. 
Also, weaknesses found with local governance are a 
reflection of problems affecting governance more 
broadly and cannot be attributed to the decentralisation 
process.
This paper discusses the scope, motivations and 
impact of decentralisation with the following structure. 
After this introduction, section 2 reviews the concept of 
decentralisation and the rationale of decentralisation 
policies. It also discusses the elements for successful 
decentralisation. Section 3 analyses decentralisation in 
the Africa context. It discusses the extent and depth of 
decentralisation, the drivers and impact on service 
delivery and poverty. Section 4 concludes with a discus-
sion of the limits of decentralisation in Africa. The paper 
also includes an appendix looking at the particular case 
of decentralised agricultural extension.
Concept, rationale and 
ingredients for success  
Notions of decentralisation
Decentralisation is not a monolithic concept (Smoke 
Decentralisation is not a monolithic concept (Smoke 
2003). It is often used in a loose way to refer to different 
forms of local governance, driven either by state or non-
state actors. Examples of such loosely defined decen-
tralisation practices would include: locally elected 
councils, traditional authorities, decentralised commit-
tees, local representatives of central government, etc. 
Lack of clarity about the precise meaning of decentralisa-
tion could, however, be a problem. Evidence from 
southern Africa indicates that the concurrence of varying 
types of decentralisation within a country often causes 
ambiguity, transaction costs and even conflict (SLSA 
Team 2003).
Ekpo (2008) defines decentralisation as a kind of 
vertical power sharing within the political system, 
whereby competences and responsibilities are distrib-
uted across different tiers of government. Decentralisation 
can take a variety of forms depending on the degree of 
d ist r ibut ion of  powers  and the nature  of 
accountability.
A crucial distinction is that between deconcentration 
and devolution. Deconcentration, also referred to as 
administrative decentralisation, consists of the transfer 
of administrative responsibilities or functions to subor-
dinate units of government, often on some geographical 
basis. Deconcentration entails the mere relocation of 
execution to the local level with decision-making power 
remaining at the centre. Devolution is a more far-reaching 
form of decentralisation which involves the transfer of 
governance powers and responsibilities to sub-national 
levels that are largely outside the direct control of the 
central government, often through an electoral process 
which makes local governments directly accountable to 
local people. Such important distinction is, however, 
often blurred in debates and policies about decentralisa-
tion (Smoke 2003). A related concept is that of delegation, 
which entails the transfer of responsibilities for public 
functions to parastatal or semi-autonomous government 
agencies, which implement programmes on behalf of 
central government. Some argue that deconcentration 
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and delegation are not true forms of decentralisation 
(World Bank 2000).
Another common distinction, which overlaps with the 
above, is that between: fiscal, institutional or administra-
tive, and political decentralisation. Fiscal decentralisation 
entails the transfer of powers to raise (tax) and retain 
(spend) financial resources to fulfil assigned responsibili-
ties. Institutional decentralisation refers to the creation 
or development of administrative bodies, systems and 
mechanisms, at local or intergovernmental level, to 
manage and support the decentralisation process, 
including links between formal government bodies and 
other key local actors such as traditional authorities, non-
governmental organisation or private sector agents 
(Smoke 2003). Political decentralisation entails a degree 
of accountability to local people, through, for example, 
an electoral process. 
These three forms of decentralisation are closely 
linked. Political and institutional decentralisation would 
have little impact without the transfer of powers to 
generate and manage resources. Without a broadly inclu-
sive local political process it would be difficult to ensure 
that sub-national governments understand and act on 
the needs of local people, irrespective of the quality of 
institutions and capacities to raise resources locally 
(Smoke 2003).
Privatisation and deregulation are also sometimes 
referred to as forms of decentralisation (also known as 
economic or market decentralisation), involving delega-
tion of powers and resources to private ownership 
(Litvack and Seddon 1999). 
This paper focuses essentially on decentralisation as 
devolution of powers to locally elected governments. 
Such form of decentralisation is sometimes referred to 
as ‘democratic decentralisation’ (Crook and Manor 2000). 
Reference is also made, however, to forms of decentrali-
sation which entail  only deconcentration of 
administrative functions to the local level, as they often 
run in parallel to deeper decentralisation processes and 
tend to prevail in the Africa context.
Rationale
Decentralisation is often portrayed as a welcome gover-
nance reform expected to improve efficiency and equity 
of resource allocation and to promote participation and 
empowerment of local people. The success of decen-
tralisation processes depends, however, and as discussed 
further below, on country circumstances, the design of 
the decentralisation process and the institutional 
arrangements governing its implementation. Smoke 
(2003) argues that decentralisation is not inherently posi-
tive or negative and recommends that any discussion 
about decentralisation starts from a neutral standpoint. 
Table 1 offers a selection of pros and cons.
It is commonly argued that since local governments 
are spatially and institutionally closer to the people, they 
have a better understanding of local needs and prefer-
ences and are better able to respond to these than central 
governments. Since the majority of the poor in Africa 
still live in rural and remote areas then the corollary to 
the above argument is that decentralised governments 
are more likely to carry out pro-poor policies. This argu-
ment has been questioned and there is mounting 
evidence that decentralisation is not necessarily pro-poor 
(Crook 2003, Jütting et al. 2005). Crook (2003) argues 
that the degree of responsiveness  to the poor and the 
extent to which there is an impact on poverty are deter-
mined primarily by the politics of local-central relations 
and the general regime context, particularly the commit-
ment of central political authorities to poverty reduction. 
Decentralisation may increase participation and account-
ability but there is no evidence, at least in the Africa 
context, that this generates better outputs (i.e. services) 
Table 1. Selection of arguments in favour and against decentralisation
Arguments favourable to decentralisation Arguments against decentralisation
 • Local government have better information about local preferences, 
needs and the way local systems operate and can therefore allocate 
resources in a more efficient way
 • Quality of service provision can be improved since local governments 
are likely to be more sensitive to variations in local requirements and 
open to feedback from service users
 • Local governments are more accountable to local communities 
 • Decentralised governance increases the chances for the poor to access 
policy processes
 • Local action can solve problems of collective action, providing sustain-
able use of common property resources 
 • Decentralisation makes governments more responsive to the demand 
of local people by promoting competitiveness between sub-national 
governments1
 • Decentralisation may lead to more creative, innovative and responsive 
programmes by allowing local experimentation and by improving 
competitiveness of governments 
 • Decentralisation may make cost recovery less difficult for governments 
as people may be more willing to pay for services if such services respond 
to their priorities and particularly if they have been involved in the 
decision-making process
 • Economies of scale at central level 
justify centralisation of services
 • Agglomeration economies in 
attracting skilled civil servants to 
the centre justify centralisation
 • Local governments are more 
subject to corruption and elite 
capture
 • Local governments can be regres-
sive – minorities may find it more 
difficult to organise locally
 • Decentralisation can aggravate 
regional disparities in the provision 
of public services
 • Decentralisation can make coordi-
nation of national policies more 
complex
 • Decentralisation increases macro-
economic risks of over-expanding 
the size of the public sector
Sources: Bardhan (1996), Azfar et al. (1999), Litvack and Seddon (1999), Smoke (2003) and Robinson (2003).
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and outcomes (i.e. measured in terms of social indicators) 
for the poor. 
Social networks at local level may enable local govern-
ments to solve collective action problems. These same 
networks may however make local governments more 
prone to corruption (Bardhan 1996). Decentralisation 
could also exacerbate regional disparities and bring local 
elites into power, aggravating inequalities in the distribu-
tion of resources. Economies of scale and agglomeration 
may also be used to justify the centralisation of certain 
services.
Decentralisation may generate opportunities for cost 
recovery as people are usually more willing to pay for 
services if such services respond to their priorities and 
if they have been involved in the decision-making 
process. But decentralisation may also increase public 
spending and debt, posing threats to macroeconomic 
managing. 
Decentralisation may hold the potential to empower 
local people and increase governance responsiveness 
to local needs but, as the following section discusses, a 
number of conditions have to be fulfilled for decentralisa-
tion reforms to generate the desired outcomes.
Ingredients for success?
What are the key ingredients for ‘democratic decentralisa-
tion’ to work? The literature suggests there are number 
of basic elements which should either be in place or 
developed as part of the decentralisation process. These 
relate to country specificities (such as, degree of democ-
racy, institutional capacities and level of economic devel-
opment) and the nature of the decentralisation process 
(policy design and implementation process), although 
Jütting et al. (2004) provide evidence that the latter may 
be more important than the former. Successful decen-
tralisation is understood here as a process which improves 
outputs and outcomes at local level, including in the 
volume and quality of public services and reductions in 
income and non-income dimensions of poverty (e.g. 
empowerment).
The ingredients for successful decentralisation can be 
grouped into three categories: political, fiscal and admin-
istrative (Jütting et al. 2005).
Political factors
 • Political commitment from the centre. Political commit-
ment to decentralisation from the centre is essential 
for effective decentralisation, and especially pro-poor 
decentralisation processes. Evidence suggests that 
successful pro-poor decentralisation is associated with 
governments that are politically committed to the 
democratic empowerment of local governments, 
through the delegation of power and resources. 
Examples include the India states of West Bengal and 
Kerala, Bolivia, South Africa and the Philippines. In 
Ghana, the impact of the decentralisation process has 
been weakened due to somewhat partial deconcentra-
tion of powers, as central government maintained the 
presence of appointees in local government bodies 
(Jütting et al. 2005).
 • Political commitment and leadership from local 
government. Commitment and leadership from local 
governments is also key to ensure effective response 
to the opportunities presented by higher level commit-
ment. The electoral process plays a role here as it should 
promote the competition required to ensure that the 
best leaders are put in office (Robinson 2003).
 • Policy coherence. Policy coherence is a sign of commit-
ment to decentralisation. It is often the case that central 
government adopts sectoral policies which undermine 
the power of local authorities by indirectly limiting 
resources and functions, compromising the decentrali-
sation process (Jütting et al. 2005).
 • Accountability mechanisms. Accountability mecha-
nisms need to be in place to hold bureaucrats account-
able to elected representatives and elected 
representatives accountable to citizens (Crook and 
Manor 2000).
 • Political mobilisation of the poor. The extent of people’s 
engagement, by the poor in particular, with decen-
tralised policy processes depends, to some extent, on 
the presence of an organised civil society independent 
from the state and with capacity to promote the inter-
ests of the poor. A strong civil society and its inclusion 
in the decentralisation process seem to have strength-
ened pro-poor outcomes of decentralisation (ibid).
 • Institutionalised participation. Some argue that having 
institutionalised arrangements to support participa-
tion in place (e.g. consultative bodies) will facilitate 
public engagement while others claim that such 
arrangements undermine popular resistance and over-
sight (Robinson 2003). Participatory budgets in Brazil 
are an example of reportedly successful experiences 
with institutionalised participation.
Fiscal factors
 • Adequacy of financial resources. The availability of 
financial resources is a basic condition for effective 
decentralisation. Without some degree of financial 
decentralisation, the transfer of responsibilities cannot 
be operationalised. But the financial autonomy of local 
governments is bound to be constrained by the limited 
scope for raising revenue locally, the fact that transfers 
from central government are often earmarked to 
specific programmes and activities, and the fact that 
salaries and recurrent expenditures tend to account 
for a large share of local government budgets. Limited 
financial autonomy may undermine local govern-
ment’s capacity to implement local development 
programmes which respond to the needs of local 
people.
Administrative factors
 • Division of central/local roles. There needs to be clarity 
about the distribution of responsibilities and powers 
between central and local governments and about 
the expected relationship between these different 
levels of governance, such as the rules and practices 
governing fiscal transfers. (Jütting et al. 2005, Ekpo 
2008).
 • Technical and managerial capacity. Technical and 
managerial capacities are often weak at local level. 
Decentralisation of responsibilities and resources is 
not necessarily accompanied by measures to ensure 
local government’s capacity for planning, budgeting, 
implementing and monitoring. Lack of such capacities 
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is likely to have a bearing on service delivery (Robinson 
2003). Jutting et al. (2005) suggest that successful 
decentralisation is not necessarily preceded by strong 
local human capacity, but investments in building local 
capacity are part of the decentralisation process.
Where such conditions are fulfilled, decentralisation 
could be a powerful tool for reducing poverty (Jütting 
et al. 2005, Ndegwa 2002). The challenge is that most of 
the above conditions cannot be fulfilled in practice, 
particularly in those countries where pro-poor decen-
tralisation may be mostly needed, such as in many African 
countries. Smoke (2003) suggests that where the basic 
conditions are not in place they should be incorporated 
in the reform programme for building decentralisation. 
Ahmad et al. (2005) confirm this point by arguing that 
decentralisation is not a one-off policy change but an 
on-going process. It is therefore the dynamics of the 
process that matter. They emphasise the importance of 
reform sequencing, choice among different forms of 




The wave of decentralisation in Africa started between 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, often in the context of 
public sector reforms associated with structural adjust-
ment programmes. Countries like Uganda, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya and Tanzania, 
were among the first to include decentralisation in their 
public sector reform packages. 
There are important research gaps on decentralisation 
in Africa though. Few studies review decentralisation 
experiences across the region in a comprehensive and 
comparative way. Much of the available evidence is anec-
dotal or focused on a very specific set of issues, such as 
participation, empowerment or fiscal autonomy. Variety 
of experiences and context makes comparison difficult. 
Some comparative studies have used the ratio of sub-
national expenditures to central government expendi-
tures as the indicators of the degree of decentralisation, 
but such indicator is misleading and provides no indica-
tion about the nature and depth of decentralisation 
policy.
Despite data gaps, available evidence suggests that 
the overall picture for decentralisation in Africa is 
glooming, as there are no undisputable success stories 
in terms of governance outputs and outcomes at local 
level. Failure has been explained, inter alia, by: over-
centralisation of resources, limited transfers to sub-
national government, narrow local revenue base, lack of 
local planning capacity, limited changes in legislation 
and the absence of a meaningful local political process 
(Robinson 2003). 
Conyers (2007) argues, however, that decentralisation 
is yet to have a fair trial in Africa, as few African countries 
have experienced true devolution of powers and 
resources to local governments. Furthermore, weak-
nesses found with decentralised governance are a reflec-
tion of problems affecting governance more broadly, 
such as lack of accountability mechanisms, poor admin-
istrative capacity of the state and weak civil society.
Forms and depth of decentralisation
The extent and depth of decentralisation in Africa is 
assessed by Ndegwa (2002) on the basis of indexes 
measuring the degree of political, administrative and 
fiscal decentralisation in 30 African countries – Figure 12. 
Such assessment suggests a mixed picture. Although all 
countries were found to have structures of sub-national 
governance in place, analysis revealed the continued 
dominance by central government. Decentralisation in 
Africa has been widespread but not deep. 
The study also indicates that decentralisation in Africa 
has been progressing unevenly both in terms of 
Figure 1.2  Extent of decentralisation in Africa (aggregation of political, administrative and fiscal indexes)
Sources: Ndegwa (2002). Index score on a scale of 0 to 4.
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geographical spread and in terms of the nature of decen-
tralised capacities. Political decentralisation was found 
to be the most widespread component of the decen-
tralisation process, although not necessary deeply estab-
lished. Although most countries have elected local 
structures, fairness and freedom of the electoral process 
are often questionable. Also, broad-based participation 
beyond elections and downward accountability3  were 
found to be low.
Countries scored relatively high on administrative 
decentralisation, a reflection of the fact that deconcen-
tration has been the preferred pathway to decentralisa-
tion in Africa. But even administrative decentralisation 
has been of questionable quality. Upward accountability4, 
from local to central governments, scored very low. The 
transfer of powers to the local level has generally not 
been supported by supervision measures from the centre 
needed for the newly empowered local authorities to 
deliver on their new mandates and this may have 
compromised the effectiveness of the decentralisation 
process in Africa.
Fiscal decentralisation was found to be lagging behind 
– in more than half of the countries reviewed, local 
governments control less than 5% of the national public 
expenditure. 
In Ndegwa’s assessment, South Africa and Uganda 
appear consistently in the top ranking of decentralisation 
experiences. Kenya and Ethiopia appear, together with 
Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Cote d’Ivoire, amongst other, 
in the group of countries with moderate degrees of 
decentralisation. Malawi is amongst the group of coun-
tries with low levels of decentralisation. 
But Ndegwa’s assessment has, as the author explains, 
a number of caveats. For example, the proportion of fiscal 
transfers to localities on national public expenditures, 
used to compute the fiscal decentralisation index, says 
nothing about the localities’ discretionary power over 
the allocation such transfers. Also, Ndegwa’s political 
index does not capture issues like equitable access to 
the political process. In fact, in another assessment 
(Jütting et al. 2005), Uganda get a less optimistic rating, 
largely due to strong direct central state intervention, 
limited local control over financial resources and elite 
capture of local politics in spite of increases in political 
participation.
Drivers 
Although the explicit justifications for decentralisation 
may vary from country to country, political motivations 
tend to play a major role. Decentralisation may result 
from pressure to reform the state. The international 
community, driven by empowerment and efficiency 
narratives, has been an important driving force pushing 
for decentralisation reforms. But in the African context, 
the politics of ethno-regional relations is particularly 
important in shaping the design and outcomes of decen-
tralisation (Crook and Sverrisson 2001, Ndegwa 2002, 
Crook 2003, Smoke 2003).
Crook and Sverrisson (2001) anticipate four possible 
decentralisation scenarios shaped by the nature of 
political relations between central and local govern-
ments. Such relations result primarily from the character 
and power bases of the ruling elite (at national level) and 
their relationships with local elites. The configuration of 
local economic, social and political structures is, on the 
other hand, important to determine the power bases of 
local elites and hence their relationships with the ruling 
elite.
One possible scenario is that the ruling elite at central 
level seeks to expand and consolidate its power base 
through alliances with local elites. Under this scenario it 
is unlikely that decentralisation would produce pro-poor 
outcomes as policies and resource allocation would tend 
to reinforce conservative forces. Evidence suggests that 
governments in Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe have all used decentralised 
structures to consolidate ruling party power and influ-
ence at the local level through alliances with local elites 
(Crook 2003).
Another scenario is that the ruling elite challenges 
local established powerful groups, for ideological, class 
or ethnic reasons. In this case, decentralisation is likely 
to take the form of deconcentration with a strong role 
played by central government to counter local elite 
capture and to construct a new political base. Although 
this is not necessarily a pro-poor scenario, there are a 
few examples of pro-poor policies being pursued in such 
contexts in Asia and Latin America (see section 3.4).
A third scenario would occur where there is a threat 
of regional/ethnic separatism or of emerging political 
rivals challenging central power. In this case central 
government would adopt a decentralisation strategy 
which would deliberately fragment local power bases 
into weak and politically insignificant units. In Uganda, 
decentralisation was used to fragment important geo-
political areas which constituted a threat to central power 
(Crook 2003).
Finally, the fourth scenario would be the consolidation 
of a powerful ruling elite in a context where local elites 
do not have significant autonomous power. Under this 
scenario, decentralisation would usually take the form 
of deconcentration, and would be used to articulate the 
power of the regime down to local level. Outcomes would 
in this case depend on the motivations of central govern-
ment. If done well, decentralisation could in this context 
deliver more effective spatial redistribution of resources. 
But it could also consolidate a corrupt centrally-driven 
patronage system (Crook and Sverrisson 2001).
Impact on service delivery 
The very limited evidence available on the impact of 
decentralisation on service delivery in Africa, focused on 
a reduced number of sectors and country cases, suggests 
that overall impact has been limited in terms of quality, 
quantity and equity of service provision (Conyers 2007). 
The few cases documenting a positive link between 
decentralisation and service delivery in Africa come from 
the health and roads maintenance sectors. Conyers 
(2007) quotes evidence from Mehrotra (2006) that indi-
cates that decentralisation of primary healthcare services 
to locally elected heath committees in Benin, Guinea 
and Mali, and to local government in Mozambique, has 
increased access to affordable health services and this 
has contributed to improvements in immunisation rates 
and infant mortality. Impact was found to be associated 
with the nature of the decentralisation process and was 
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likely to be greater where powers and resources were 
de facto transferred to local governments. 
In spite of the shortage of studies assessing impact 
on service delivery there is a wealth of studies on the 
impact of decentralisation on intermediate variables 
affecting service delivery, such as access to local informa-
tion, the locus of decision-making power, resource avail-
ability, administrative performance and accountability 
between central and local government (Conyers 2007, 
Ahmad et al. 2005). We discuss each of these in turn.
Participation (as a means to accessing local informa-
tion) alone does not guarantee that the quality and 
relevance of development plans will be improved (impor-
tant to improve allocative efficiency) and does not guar-
antee influence in policy making. In all depends on who 
participates and under which terms, which is determined 
by local power structures. Devolution of powers to local 
elected authorities does not necessarily ensure local 
interests and needs (particularly those of the poor) will 
be responded to. There is evidence suggesting that 
elected authorities have turned out be less representative 
and responsive than central government (evidence 
quoted in Conyers 2007).
Participation in local governance can only play a mean-
ingful role if local authorities have decision-making 
power. Early decentralisation experiences in Africa 
consisted of a mere deconcentration of planning and 
administrative capacities, with no real power transfer and 
hence limited impact. A frequent problem is that decision 
making powers are often not accompanied by financial 
management powers. Local institutions are given deci-
sion-making competences but not allowed control over 
resource allocation which compromises impact over 
service delivery. Uganda provides an example of this 
(Jütting et al 2005).
If given financial powers, local authorities would only 
be able to exert such powers if financial resources are 
available, either through sources of tax revenue, user 
fees or transfers from central government. Tax revenue 
is rarely a significant source of revenue for local govern-
ments as the tax base of predominantly rural and poor 
areas is low and both central and local governments have 
no incentives to increase taxation for political reasons. 
Evidence from Uganda suggests that central government 
is sometimes the main obstacle to increasing taxation: 
the government of Uganda abolished an important 
source of local revenue despite objections from local 
government (Conyers 2007). User fees are hardly associ-
ated with decentralisation and have typically been intro-
duced as part of structural adjustment programmes run 
by central governments rather than decentralisation 
reforms per se. Transfers from central government are 
typically the main source of revenue but these are often 
earmarked to specific activities and services defined at 
the centre and therefore do not guarantee that local 
needs and priorities will be addressed.
Administrative performance is, according to the litera-
ture, poor in most decentralised systems but this is a 
reflection of capacity limitations affecting the public 
sector more broadly. There is however evidence that 
improved downward accountability (through local elec-
tions and civil society mobilisation, for example) can 
enhance administrative performance.
Ahmad et al. (2005) emphasise the importance of 
accountability relationships between actors in the service 
delivery chain for public services. Decentralisation (or at 
least certain forms of decentralisation) introduces a new 
accountability relationship (between central and local 
policy-makers) while altering existing relationships 
(between citizens and elected politicians). The authors 
argue that such accountability mechanisms are critical 
for improving local service delivery as they affect the 
incentives facing service providers. The service delivery 
incentives facing local governments are likely to improve 
if they raise their own revenue through local taxes, rather 
than relying on central transfers whereas over-depen-
dence on central transfers can undermine the account-
ability of local governments to their electorate and hence 
the incentives for improving service delivery. 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers, on the other hand, 
introduce incentives (through budgeting and evaluation 
– i.e. local to central government accountability) to 
ensuring efficient service delivery and value for money. 
Where the tax base and capacity of central government 
to perform an oversight role are limited, as in much of 
SSA, the effects of decentralisation in service delivery 
are likely to be modest. 
Hence, it seems that, overall, the impact of decentrali-
sation in intermediate variables affecting service delivery 
outcomes depends on the particular design of decen-
tralised government systems (e.g. extent of devolution 
of powers and resources) as well as the country’s political, 
institutional and socio-economic context (e.g. local 
power structures, institutional capacities of government 
and local tax base).
Ahmad et al. (2005) also emphasise that the process 
of implementing decentralisation – such as the 
sequencing of reforms – can be as important as the 
design of the system in influencing service delivery 
outcomes. Decentralisation is a dynamic process and the 
sequencing of changes is hardly systematic but is deter-
mined by, often unpredictable, political openings that 
allow change to happen. Undertaking too many reforms 
too quickly risks overwhelming the capacity of local 
governments, creating opportunities for poor resource 
use and prematurely free local officials from central 
control without having in place effective mechanisms 
to account to local constituents (Smoke 2003). In Africa, 
decentralisation processes have often led to mismatches 
between fiscal, political and administrative responsibili-
ties – e.g. political decentralisation without fiscal authority 
or design of fiscal transfers without clarity on expenditure 
(e.g. South Africa, Mozambique) – which have compro-
mised service delivery outcomes. 
Another important process aspect stressed by Smoke 
(2003) is coordination between different actors involved 
in the decentralisation process. Ministries of Local 
Government or Home Affairs are usually at the forefront 
of decentralisation reforms but other agencies also play 
a central role. Ministries of Finance have responsibilities 
for decentralising revenues and defining financial trans-
fers to local levels. Sectoral ministries have a major role 
in the devolution of administrative responsibilities in 
their specific fields. Civil society organisations have an 
important role in mobilising local constituencies to 
engage with decentralised governance. Yet, one of the 
Working Paper 020 www.future-agricultures.org8
greatest difficulties in most decentralisation efforts in 
Africa has precisely been coordination of all the actors 
involved and the failure to build linkages between the 
different components of decentralisation. Some coun-
tries have tried to devise coordination mechanisms (e.g. 
decentralisation secretariats) but with varying success 
(ibid).
Impact on poverty
Democratic decentralisation brings government closer 
to the electorate and therefore is expected to benefit 
most the median voter, who in most developing countries 
is poor. Available evidence does not confirm, however, 
that public policies in decentralised governments 
perform better in delivering services to the poor. The 
paradox is that policy-makers that depend upon political 
support from the poor do not effectively deliver basic 
services that benefit the poor (Ahmad et al. 2005).
Ahmad et al. (2005) argue that ‘political market failures’ 
explain the paradox. They discuss three types of political 
market imperfections: lack of information by voters about 
policy-making performance; social, ethno and ideo-
logical affiliations which lead to ‘identity-based voting’, 
with lower weight being given to policy outcomes; and 
lack of credibility of political promises to voters. In devel-
oping countries, poor voters are more likely to be unin-
formed and are more susceptible to vote on the basis of 
ethnic or religious identity. Politicians are likely to be 
credible only to the few voters with whom they maintain 
clientelist relations which means that public resources 
are allocated to benefit these clients to the detriment of 
broad public services accessible to the poor. Where such 
imperfections are significant, the authors claim, political 
decentralisation might not be the most effective way of 
improving pro-poor service delivery.
Evidence from a selection of sub-Saharan African 
countries5  shows that the degree of responsiveness by 
policy-makers to the poor and the extent to which decen-
tralisation impacts on poverty are determined essentially 
by the politics of local-central relations (e.g. extent to 
which ruling elites control local powers) and the commit-
ment of central authorities to poverty reduction (Crook 
2003). Decentralisation is unlikely to be pro-poor without 
improved accountability mechanisms at both local and 
national levels.
Crook (2003) assesses the pro-poor character of decen-
tralisation experiences by analysing five dimensions of 
poverty: empowerment of the poor (i.e. responsiveness 
of government and effectiveness of participation of the 
poor), pro-poor economic growth, equality of income 
distribution, human development and spatial inequality. 
It concludes that decentralisation has had little impact 
on poverty in the selected African countries. 
With regards to empowerment, although there are 
signs of increased participation in decentralised govern-
ment in Africa, there is little evidence it has resulted in 
policy responsiveness, that is, better correspondence 
between the needs and preferences of the local people 
and public policy – Box 1 provides examples from Ghana, 
Cote d’Ivoire and Kenya.
The lack of responsiveness is due to weaknesses in 
accountability mechanisms which fail to ensure the inter-
ests of the poor are effectively represented in policy 
making. In Tanzania, responsiveness is particularly weak 
in rural and poorer districts where poverty and lack of 
education compromises constituents’ capacity to access 
and influence district councillors.
As for commitment of local governments to pro-poor 
economic growth this is hardly present. In Nigeria, where 
most of the population depends on agriculture, most 
local governments do not have agricultural development 
programmes, spending their resources mostly on urban 
infrastructure and recurrent costs. Paradoxically, rural 
infrastructures, especially those to support agricultural 
development, are often not within the remit of local 
governments.
As for social equity, decentralisation in Africa does not 
tend to favour representation of disadvantaged groups, 
Evidence from selected African countries suggests that participation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
greater policy responsiveness to the needs of the poor.
In Ghana, District Assemblies were introduced in 1989, under the military rule, to improve electoral participation and 
enhance access to groups normally excluded from policy processes. These Assemblies have indeed improved participa-
tion, particularly those normally excluded such as farmers, traders and artisans. But their responsiveness to the needs of 
the people, particularly the less privileged in rural areas, such as women, has been disappointing. District surveys 
revealed the lack of congruence between District Assembly investments (in office buildings and equipment for the new 
Assemblies, as well as centrally determined programmes) and popular preferences for road repairs, health facilities, 
water supplies and electricity.  
In Cote d’Ivoire, the systems of local Communes, urban settlements with population of usually less than 20,000, is 
largely dominated by the elite, with Mayors that continue living in Abidjan. Consultation with local citizens hardly takes 
place and the Communes’ favoured investments, on town halls and secondary schools, hardly correspond to popular 
preferences for roads, social facilities and water supplies. 
In Kenya, a country placed by the study at the bottom of the list in terms of reputation for pro-poor responsiveness 
(alongside Nigeria and Zimbabwe), a District Focus for Rural Development system was introduced in 1983. It incorpo-
rates representatives of locally elected government but it is essentially a deconcentration of central ministries tightly 
controlled by central officials. District Commissioners are appointed by the President and take decisions on resources 
allocations which are driven by political patronage while undermining local rules and procedures and the local revenue 
system (as there is reluctance to enforce tax payments and extract used charges to people known to politicians and 
officials). Representation by the poor is limited and popular participation ‘an illusion’.
Source: Crook (2003)
Box 1. Participation not enough for pro-poor policy: the cases of Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire 
and Kenya
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but rather strengthen patronage networks which are 
hardly equitable in distributing rents. Some positive 
results for pro-poor decentralisation have however been 
reported in terms of spatial equality. In most African 
countries local governments are dependent on central 
transfers, as the local revenue base is very narrow. This 
means there is scope for redistribution of resources from 
richer to poorer regions. Decentralisation has produced 
positive results in countries where it allowed poor remote 
areas with few or no services to have access to new 
resources. In Ghana, the creation of the District Common 
Fund is an example of that. In Kenya, the District Focus 
for Rural Development system resulted in a redistribution 
to poorer areas but the motivations for this are likely to 
have been driven by political interests rather than by 
pro-poor concerns – the objective may have been to 
strengthen President Moi’s political base outside the 
more affluent Kikuyu territory.
However, increased spatial distribution of resources 
can in some cases undermine poverty reduction objec-
tives. It is argued that in Uganda, devolution of funding 
and increased in local tax raising fragmented available 
investment capital and made pro-poor redistribution of 
resources more difficult (Belshaw 2000 quoted in Crook 
2003).
There are, however, success stories in terms of pro-
poor decentralisation reforms, but these come from other 
world regions. The Indian states of West Bengal and Kerala 
and the Brazilian states of Ceará and Minas Gerais and 
Rio Grande do Sul provide the few documented positive 
experiences – Box 2.
Success is explained by the relationships between 
central and local ruling elites and the political goals of 
decentralisation reforms. The political motivations of 
strong central government interested in challenging 
conservative local elites and constructing a new political 
base through anti-poverty policies seems to have been 
the key to success. In Africa, however, the political moti-
vations behind decentralisation reforms tend to follow 
a totally different logic. Decentralisation is often used to 
control local power bases or consolidate alliances with 
local elites in order to reinforce the ruling party’s power 
and influence at the local level rather than to challenge 
local elites who are resistant to or uninterested in pro-
poor policies. Decentralisation in Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe has been used to consolidate 
ruling party power at local level, and also to build new 
local power bases (e.g. Moi in Kenya).
Conclusion: the limits of 
decentralisation in Africa
In the analysis above a number of limitations to decen-
tralisation in Africa emerge. These relate to institutional 
capacities, fiscal constraints and, above all, the political 
context.
Ethno-regional pluralism which characterises many 
African countries is a source of political instability and a 
challenge to the unitary structure of the state. 
Decentralisation is, in such contexts, risky and the depth 
of decentralisation reforms will be toned down by the 
threat of reinforcing political rivals or nurturing sepa-
ratism. In such cases decentralisation is deliberately used 
to weaken rather than strengthen local power bases, 
while reinforcing central funding and control mecha-
nisms that allow for spatial redistribution and centrally-
focused patronage linkages (Crook 2003). In Nigeria the 
military regime used local governments to control ethnic 
opposition and transfer resources from oil producing to 
non-oil producing areas. In Uganda, decentralisation was 
used to fragment rival ethnic claims and put off demands 
for a multi-party system (ibid). 
In more homogeneous societies, other factors may 
play a role. Political market failures – such as lack of infor-
mation by voters on political performance – may explain 
the lack of responsiveness of policy-makers to the median 
voter, that is, the rural poor. Where political market fail-
ures are significant decentralisation is unlikely to be 
pro-poor.
Institutional weaknesses pose considerable obstacles 
to successful decentralisation. Some of these, such as 
local capacity gaps, can be addressed. But some other, 
which are closely associated with the political context 
are harder to tackle. For example, the effectiveness of 
downward accountability mechanisms depends on the 
political mobilisation of people. Upward accountability 
depends on the real motivations of central government. 
Furthermore, institutional coordination of different key 
players in the decentralisation process is premised not 
only on managerial capacity but more importantly on 
leadership and commitment by the key parts. 
Fiscal constraints are related to the low resource base 
and limited absorptive capacity at local level due to insti-
tutional weaknesses. These constraints not only limit 
what local governments can effectively do with their 
newly assigned competences but, perhaps more impor-
tantly in the long term, they compromise the develop-
ment of a local constituency for local government which 
would be the key source of demand for good local 
governance.
Democratic decentralisation in West Bengal, India, is associated with a programme of radical agrarian reform imple-
mented over more than 20 years which produced significant benefits for the poor in terms of participation, growth of 
agricultural production and human development. 
In Brazil, rural development programmes funded by federal government and state and city level programmes launched 
by progressive reforming parties have delivered considerable pro-poor outcomes. In the state of Ceará, the success of 
highly innovative rural preventive health and employment generating policies is explained by the dynamic interaction 
between local government, state government and civil society. 
Source: Crook (2003)
Box 2. Good practice with pro-poor decentralisation in India and Brazil
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Does this imply that decentralisation is doomed in 
Africa? It seems that, as an overarching governance 
process, decentralisation may have limited chances of 
success, without a more structural transformation in 
African societies which reduces the polarisation of power 
and gives the median voter more agency. Sector experi-
ences suggest, however, that sector-bound decentralisa-
tion may be more manageable in the short term – the 
case of decentralised agricultural extension is analysed 
in annex. A limitation of sector-bound decentralisation 
is, however, its compartmentalisation into sector specific 
institutional arrangements which may make it ill-suited 
to respond to the complexity of rural livelihoods (SLSA 
Team 2003).
Appendix
Decentralisation in the agriculture sector: 
the case of extension services
Rationale for decentralising extension services
The literature suggests that decentralisation can an effec-
tive means for improving service delivery and reducing 
poverty provided certain conditions are in place and the 
political regime is favourable. But decentralisation does 
not necessarily make sense for any type of public services. 
Different public sector services will have different suitable 
governance arrangements. The specific services to 
decentralise and the form of decentralisation to adopt 
will depend on economies of scale affecting technical 
efficiency and degree of spillover effects beyond juris-
dictional boundaries (Litvack and Seddon, 1999 eds, p.7). 
In agriculture, there is a case for decentralising exten-
sion services, or at least some components of such 
services, as context specificity and responsiveness to 
demand ought to be important features of services 
provided and direct contact with beneficiaries (mostly 
farmers living in rural areas) is required. Decentralisation 
potentially increases user ownership of extension 
programmes (many use participatory methods) and 
financial support for services (through user chargers, 
outsourcing and private provision), thereby developing 
constituencies for extension and ensuring greater 
accountability (World Bank 2000). 
Despite its suitability to decentralisation, extension 
services in the developing world, and in Africa in partic-
ular, remain heavily centralised although there have been 
some attempts to revert this.
Decentralisation of extension services have taken a 
variety of forms. Ghana in the 1990s deconcentrated its 
extension system by transferring management and tech-
nical functions to regional and district extension offices. 
This form of decentralisation proved however insufficient 
to ensure rural participation in planning and responsive-
ness to farmers’ needs (Swanson and Samy 2002). There 
are examples of devolution of extension systems in Asia, 
Europe and America, whereby extension administrators 
are primarily responsible to the local government and 
local government co-finance extension services. There 
are also examples of delegation and privatisation of 
extension services – Integrated Rural Development proj-
ects, popular in the 1970s and 1980s in much of the 
developing world, often included extension compo-
nents. Such projects were usually managed by autono-
mous administrative units which functioned well but 
collapsed after the end of external funds. Transfer of 
extension functions from central government to the 
private sector, farmer associations and NGOs has become 
increasingly popular since the 1990s. International and 
national NGOs have been playing a particular important 
role in African countries and they have become particu-
larly effective in providing educational and other services 
to small and marginal farm households in African coun-
tries (evidence quoted in Swanson and Samy 2002).
The conditions suggested in the literature for effective 
decentralisation of agricultural services are largely the 
same found for decentralisation in general. Drawing on 
a number of case studies, Swanson and Samy (2002) 
identify the following key elements for a successful 
decentralisation of national extension systems. One is a 
legal framework and structure of authority that defines 
the decentralised extension levels and how they relate 
to each other. Drawing on the earlier discussion in this 
paper, political commitment and clarity in the division 
of roles might be more important, however, than actual 
legislation. Stakeholder participation is identified as 
another essential ingredient in decentralising agricultural 
extension systems, as active civil societies play an impor-
tant supporting role to decentralised extension. 
Adequate managerial capacity at lower levels to carry 
out additional responsibilities is another important 
success condition as well as knowledge and technical 
skills of extension agents. Adequate funding for local 
level extension is essential for implementation of decen-
tralised extension. And finally, accountability to benefi-
ciaries and to those who fund extension programmes is 
important to ensure good performance of extension 
systems. In addition to legal oversight and administrative 
mechanisms (such as monitoring systems or incentives 
schemes), it is suggested that promoting competition 
between different providers (public, private and NGOs) 
is an effective means to improve efficiency and 
accountability.
The case for decentralisation should not be used as 
an argument against the role of central government in 
agriculture, and in extension in particular. The provision 
of certain functions by central government agencies 
remains justifiable, largely for economies of scale, over-
sight and equity reasons. Central government has impor-
tant coordination, backstopping, supervision and 
inter-regional distributional roles to play. A World Bank 
review of agricultural extension best practices suggests 
that functions best centralised are those that support 
national strategies and financing mechanisms, involve 
economies of scale and scope, serve various administra-
tive regions, and require specialised technical input that 
may not be available at local level – Table 2. 
Furthermore, there are risks associated with decen-
tralisation which need to be taken into account: duplica-
tion of ineffective administrative structures in place at 
the centre, poor quality of services provided due to lack 
of adequate technical competences and financial 
resources (Swanson and Samy 2002). Lack of coordina-
tion between local administrations can also be a problem 
as different localities or regions can focus on promoting 
the same commodity leading to overproduction and low 
prices (World Bank 2000).
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Table 2. Centralised and decentralised extension functions
Extension functions Level of provision
Extension policy, strategy formulation and planning Centralised
Training programmes for extension agents Centralised or decentralised
Technical specialist support to extension agents Centralised
Production of extension publications and other support materials Centralised
Monitoring and evaluation Both levels
Training programmes for farmers Decentralised
Market information services Centralised 
Encouragement for private sector extension Mixed
Mass media campaigns Centralised, but may be decentralised
Internet/telephone dissemination of information and fielding 
questions from farmers, agribusinesses or extension agents
Centralised 
Sources: World Bank (2000).
Table 3. Types of extension systems according to source of funding and delivery
Public delivery Private delivery
Public funding Traditional government extension system Outsourcing of responsibility for extension 
delivery to non-public sector providers such 
as NGOs and CBOs
Private funding Government staff contracted by private 
agencies to deliver extension services
Commercial entities provide their suppliers 
with extension services required to improve 
their technical efficiency
1. Centralise or decentralise programmes as appropriate to the particular extension service: programme execution 
and authority should rest at the level most appropriate for effective user influence. The local level is likely to be the 
adequate level for extension and adaptive research, the national or state level for extension support services and 
strategic and applied research.
2. Adapt strategies to local institutional environments: decentralisation strategies must conform to local needs and 
potential. Decentralisation of extension must reflect the general status of political decentralisation in a country.
3. Strengthen central support services for extension: decentralised extension requires central support to plan and 
coordinate programmes, facilitate institutional linkages, formulate policies and ensure that national priorities are 
addressed.
4. Provide mechanisms for policy formulation in mixed systems: reconciling national policy objectives with priorities 
emerging from decentralised programmes requires flexibility and planning and budgeting systems that integrate 
both sets of priorities.
5. Continue to provide public sector financing: decentralisation may initially increase the level of public funding 
required, but over the long term is offers opportunities for producers to cofinance some services. Financial 
participation will increase beneficiaries’ ownership and interest in extension programmes.
6. Fiscal transfers for research and extension: fiscal transfers from central government will always be required. They 
should be structured to give users maximum influence over programme design.
7. Plan for transition and local capacity development: building local capacities is a prerequisite for decentralising 
extension services. Investments in staff development, management systems and facilities are required. All of this 
takes time.
8. Ensure monitoring and evaluation of decentralised systems: strong central M&E is required in the early stages of 
decentralisation. Local institutions need to develop their own M&E to support programme design and 
management at local level. Integration between different levels is required to produce quality and reliable 
information.
Source: World Bank (2000)
Box 3. Good practice for decentralisation in World Bank extension projects
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Evidence of impact of decentralised extension
Is there evidence that access and quality of extension 
services improves with decentralisation of extension 
systems? One study shows that access to extension 
services in Kenya has improved with decentralisation 
(Nambiro et al. 2006). Decentralisation of agricultural 
extension services in Kenya has involved decentralisation 
of government responsibilities through structural 
reforms and increased participation of end users in exten-
sion programmes. Four types of delivery system currently 
coexist in Kenya’s decentralised extension system – Table 
3.
Nambiro et al. (2006) show that farmers are more likely 
to seek extension advice in areas of greater decentralisa-
tion where different channels for delivery of extension 
services exist using complementary methods of opera-
tion. In particular, in agriculturally marginal areas (Makuni 
district in eastern Kenya) farmers living in areas of higher 
decentralisation of services were significantly more likely 
to access demand-induced extension. But the study also 
finds that income and literacy levels of the household 
head impact on the likelihood of receiving demand-
induced extension services and therefore such services 
might marginalise the poor and ill-informed.
The study also finds that there is willingness to pay 
for extension services (by 49% of farmers enquired by 
the study) which justifies privatisation of extension if 
high quality services can be provided. Yet the study also 
notes that government has a crucial role to play in low 
potential and remote areas to ensure that the poor are 
not deprived of extension services. Also, public extension 
services are still considered the most affordable and reli-
able source of extension information (at least in high 
potential areas) although due to funding constraints 
might not be available in the quantity required. 
Policy implications
There are important roles for public and private 
suppliers to play in decentralised extension systems. 
Coordination of activities between these different 
providers seems to be the key to ensure that comple-
mentarities are explored and duplication of efforts is 
avoided. The role of central services continues to be 
important in a decentralised extension system, particu-
larly in ensuring coordination between providers and 
across regions and localities. 
Good practice suggests that certain administrative 
functions, such as strategy development and monitoring 
and evaluation, as well as specialised technical support 
are better provided at central level – Box 3. Hence, central 
and local government need to support each other for 
decentralised extension systems to work effectively. In 
this new relationship, central government’s role changes 
from one of control to one of supervision, facilitation 
and support (World Bank 2000).
As this paper illustrated, however, the extent to which 
relations between central and local government will work 
effectively depends to a considerable extent on under-
lying motivations and political dynamics as well as on 
the capacity of service users to make governments 
accountable.
End Notes
1 People reveal their preferences by “voting with feet” 
and moving to those jurisdictions that satisfy their 
preferences (Azfar et al. 1999).
2  The political decentralisation index takes into account 
the number of elected sub-national tiers, the score for 
the existence of direct elections for local governments, 
and the score for turnout and fairness of such elections.  
The administrative decentralisation index includes the 
score for the clarity of roles for national and local 
government provided by the law, the score indicative of 
where the actual responsibility for service delivery 
resided, and the score indicative of where the 
responsibility for civil servants resided. The fiscal 
decentralisation index was computed as the mean on 
the score given for the arrangements for fiscal transfers 
from the central government to localities and the score 
corresponding to the proportion of public expenditure 
controlled by the localities. 
3  Downward accountability is measured by the 
presence of institutions necessary to enforce 
accountability, such as elections and citizen 
participation forums.
4  Upward accountability is measured on the basis of 
the existence of supervisory instruments on 
performance from the centre such as auditing of 
accounts, service delivery standards and monitoring 
and evaluation systems.
5  Primarily, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and 
Tanzania
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